Academic stuff - My essay on the Greek crisis

As part of the assessment for the financial crises course I took during the capital markets graduate program I attended in 2022/23, we were required to write an essay on the Greek crisis. Below was my attempt, which has been slightly modified to correct grammatical errors I previously overlooked.

The Greek ‘Spartan’ Crisis and Lessons for Developing Economies[1]

Executive Summary

Admission into the ‘promising’ euro area unlocked growth potential for Greece, as it had access to low-interest rates, coupled with capital and labour inflows. To sustain its popularity, the Greek government embarked on excessive public spending, funded through external borrowing at low cost, while closing its eyes to tax administration and evasion problems that dampened revenues.

As the wind of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) blew across Europe and capital flows stopped, underlying vulnerabilities in Greece emerged in 2009, including significant fiscal and debt issues that had been previously masked by inaccurate statistics. Constrained by its membership in the euro area, Greece had no flexibility in monetary policy to mitigate current account deficits and control the interest rate environment. The euro area rules also prevented central bank financing of budget deficits.

A financial rescue package was prepared by eurozone partners and the IMF for Greece to mitigate systemic risk in Europe, accompanied by conditions for implementing strict reforms, which led to protests, political turmoil, and economic hardship in the country. A lack of investor confidence in the stability of other euro area member states soon led to contagion in Cyprus, Ireland, and Portugal, and to a lesser extent, in Spain and Italy.

Following a deeper-than-expected contraction in economic activity, high debt, and the government’s inability to follow through with reforms, Greece became the first advanced nation to default on its IMF obligations and thus received additional financial packages. The IMF and euro partners continued to guide Greece until it exited the bailout packages in August 2018, when it resumed access to financial markets.

Previous experiences from financial crises, especially the Argentine crisis, raise concerns about the effectiveness of the policy responses to the Greek Crisis by the IMF and euro leaders. Was Greece eligible to join the euro area at the time it did? Why were the underlying vulnerabilities not flagged despite several IMF surveillances and the ‘taunted’ strict rules of the euro area? Was the Greek crisis avoidable? Are there lessons for other nations from the Greek crisis?

      Greece Prior to 2009

Greece became a part of the now 27-member state European Union in 1981 and joined the euro area in 2001. Typically, member states join the euro area after demonstrating a high degree of sustainable convergence based on the convergence criteria laid out in the Maastricht Treaty[2] as well as compliance with the requirements for national central banks to integrate with the European System of Central Banks[3].

The Greek economy experienced tremendous growth after adopting the Euro, driven by lower interest rates, the liberalisation of the financial sector, greater access to capital, and a higher labour supply resulting from immigration. Consequently, per-capita GDP growth averaged 3.8 per cent between 2000 and 2008 in Greece, compared to 1.4 per cent in the Euro area[4].

Despite the growth opportunities, several factors increased imbalances within the Greek economy, which eventually became problematic.

      Low-Interest Rates

Following the euro's adoption, investor confidence soared in favour of the European Monetary Union, based on the belief that stronger countries within the bloc would prevent weaker countries from failing, given the various rules within the bloc. The yields of sovereign bonds reflected optimism for the monetary union as it trended downwards, resulting in reduced borrowing costs for EU countries. The lower rates, in turn, encouraged excess borrowing by member countries of the EU, including Greece.

      High Public Spending and Low Revenues

The Government of Greece took advantage of the boom period and the low-interest-rate borrowing opportunities to increase its public expenditure without a corresponding increase in revenue. Budgets for projects[5][6], military expenses[7] and welfare packages soared. Public workers received higher paychecks/pensions, and increased labour supply from immigration contributed to higher labour costs. Meanwhile, poor tax administration and tax evasion hampered growth in revenues, and the Government recorded consistent budget deficits between 1990 and 2000[8].

      Rising Debt Levels

Greece had a history of high debt, compounded by increased public spending that widened the fiscal deficit. Debt rose to about 115 per cent of the GDP[9] in 2009 from 68 per cent of GDP in 1990[10], a wide margin from the maximum debt limit of 60 per cent of GDP in the Maastricht Treaty.

     Current Account Deficit

Greece's consumption exceeded its production, leading to trade deficits that were funded through external borrowing, resulting in a more significant current account deficit[11] to approximately 15 per cent of GDP in 2008 from 5.1 per cent of GDP in 1999[12].  

   The Crisis Unfolds

The global financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007/2008 and its attendant recession reduced investors’ risk appetite and dampened confidence, slowing cross-border capital inflows. The GFC was the catalyst that revealed the underlying imbalances in the Greek economy. In October 2009, a newly elected Government in Greece, led by George Papandreou, estimated a much higher-than-expected fiscal deficit of 12.8 per cent of GDP[13] (from a previously estimated 3.6 per cent of GDP), which pointed to fiscal misappropriations and underreporting of statistics. Consequently, rating agencies downgraded Greece's debt, causing its sovereign spreads to rise above the German debt[14] as yields trended upward to compensate for the possible risk of default.

With higher borrowing costs and a sudden halt in capital inflows, Greece faced a difficult situation in financing its substantial debt obligations. Additionally, Greece lacked an independent monetary policy as a member of the euro area.  It could therefore not devalue its currency to stimulate demand for cheap exports and increase domestic investment, thereby reducing the current account deficit. The Maastricht treaty also barred the financing of budget deficits through the central bank to mitigate moral hazards. While economic activities (including production, retail sales, and tourism) slowed in Greece, the wage bill remained high with greater inflation expectations above other member states in the euro area, thus losing its competitiveness. The slowdown in activities and higher cost of funds also diminished banks' profitability; rating agencies downgraded some banks, which led to a sharp drop in banks' equity prices.[15]. By 2010, Greece had lost access to financial markets, and fears over European systemic risks necessitated a bailout.

    Policy Response and Bailouts

During the initial discussions to rescue Greece, the option of an assisted intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was not well received in Europe, so the fund provided only technical assistance to Greece on managing public finances and administering taxes. Later, Europe’s perception shifted towards the need to tap into the IMF's experiences in crisis management, which led to the first bailout package for Greece.

The first financial package – the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission formed a partnership, informally dubbed “the troika," to provide a combined loan package of € 110 billion to Greece by May 2010. The package consisted of an SDR allocation of 30 billion euros[16]  from the IMF and bilateral loans worth 80 billion euros from 15 euro area partners. It was a stand-by arrangement (SBA) of 3 years, conditional on implementing stringent policies/reforms to improve its fiscal position.[17], reduce debt, and enhance competitiveness.

The sharp reduction in public expenditure and investment led to a contraction in GDP. Inflation rose, reflecting the increased pass-through of taxes to prices. Despite the reforms, sovereign spreads remained high as markets were unconvinced that the package would eliminate the need for debt restructuring in Greece.[18]

The second financial package – An IMF review of the SBA in December 2010 showed that Greece's GDP contracted deeper than estimated, driven by low investment and private consumption, as well as inadequate credit availability for firms, and higher unemployment. Additionally, banks were found to be undercapitalised and needed liquidity support[19]. Despite making some progress with fiscal reforms, the debt remained high.

Subsequently, Greece requested debt relief from private creditors in July 2011, which was initially agreed at 21 per cent but later increased to 50 per cent, along with an extension of loan maturities and a reduction in lending rates.[20] By March 2012, the troika replaced the SBA with an extended fund facility (EFF) of 173 billion euros for four years, enabling Greece to continue with the structural adjustment program while remaining in the euro area.[21]

The third financial package – political instability and public outcry over the austerity measures stalled reform progress[22]. The Government of Greece requested flexibility in implementing reforms, as the contraction in GDP increased the debt-to-GDP ratio, which stood at approximately 157 per cent by the end of 2012.[23] However, Greece's creditors insisted on the implementation of reforms to unlock the last disbursement of the EFF. Fears that Greece would exit the euro area caused bank runs and a crash in stock prices. Subsequently, the Greek government imposed capital controls to prevent a deposit outflow and restricted ATM withdrawals. Eventually, Greece defaulted on its payment obligations to the IMF, becoming the first advanced country to do so.[24]

Following a call for a referendum on the reforms, which the public eventually rejected, the leaders of the euro area underwent several negotiations before agreeing to provide a third financial package to Greece, worth € 86 billion, in August 2015, conditional on the continuous implementation of the reforms. The agreement temporarily restored economic stability in Greece and helped secure a loan to repay arrears owed to the IMF.

Greece continued to implement structural adjustment reforms, received further credit from its eurozone partners, and secured an extension of maturities on some loans from creditors, ultimately successfully exiting the bailouts in August 2018[25].

      Contagion

As the Greek Crisis unfolded in 2009, concerns arose among investors regarding the stability of the euro area. By 2010, weaknesses in the banking industries of Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus had become exposed, and these countries subsequently requested emergency funding from European partners and the IMF. By 2011, the crisis had spilt over to Italy and Spain due to massive capital outflows. However, both countries managed the Crisis through bond purchases and financing from Europe, coupled with decisive actions, without undertaking an IMF-financing program. Ireland and Portugal exited the funding programs by 2013 and 2014, respectively, and regained access to the financial markets.[26]. The funding program for Cyprus continued into 2016, but it had regained access to financial markets by 2014.

       Post-Crisis Evaluation: Could the Crisis have been avoided?

It is usually easier to manage country vulnerabilities when there is no crisis, but no country is immune to financial contagion if it has underlying weaknesses. The GFC exposed the existing flaws in Greece's economy.

A sustainable fiscal and debt framework could have put Greece in a better position to manage negative spillovers from the GFC. Similarly, transparency in reporting economic/financial statistics could have alerted European leaders and the Greek Government to act early to resolve economic imbalances.

The accurate statistics would have shown that Greece was not yet qualified to join the euro area based on the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. In that case, Greece would have had the opportunity to allow its currency to be adjusted/devalued to resolve the current account deficit and influence the interest rate environment.

Most importantly, there were warning signs as far back as 1999. For example, the ECB Convergence Report for 2000 noted that Greece's debt was 104.4 per cent of GDP, far above the 60 per cent maximum target of the Maastricht treaty. Without any visible fiscal reforms, the IMF and European leaders should have been curious about the steps taken by the Greek Government to meet the debt ratio target between 1999 and their adoption of the Euro in 2001. They should have been more hesitant in admitting Greece into the euro area.

Furthermore, the IMF had previously raised concerns about fiscal imbalances in Greece during Article IV consultations, but did not raise sufficient alarm to prompt the implementation of urgent reforms. Its surveillance of the European Union also tended to focus on more prominent countries and did not anticipate the possibility of smaller countries causing problems within the union. The IMF also failed to predict the full ramifications of capital flow reversals within the European Union and the contagion effect.

      Was the Policy Response appropriate?[27]

Many analysts believed that the management of the Crisis could have been better if debt restructuring had been undertaken at the initial stage, as it seemed to be a more viable option before the first bailout package by the troika. The financial packages primarily served to repay debts and did little to boost Greece's economy, which continued to contract during the Crisis.

The IMF received criticism for not thoroughly evaluating all available options to support Greece, including debt restructuring, given that the country's sovereign debt already had a high probability of being unsustainable. Analysts believed that the decision to provide a bailout initially increased the fiscal adjustment required, which led to a deep contraction in Greece's GDP. It also led to low support for the bailout programs, which made it difficult for the Greek Government to implement the reforms.

Similarly, the bailout response was not well thought out, as estimations for growth and revenues were overly optimistic.[28]There seemed to be too much confidence in the Greek Government’s ability to carry out difficult reforms. The IMF had no immediate backup strategy when it became apparent that the deployed strategy was not efficient. Thus, the inefficient strategy persisted for a long time without yielding much success.

By adopting the decision already reached by European leaders to give bailout packages, the IMF seemed to have been influenced by them. Similarly, the IMF received criticism for granting the exceptional access program[29] to Greece, despite not meeting all the conditions for one, and thus was judged to have handled Europe differently than it would usually do with other countries.

The Greek crisis also shares many similarities with the Argentine crisis, in which the IMF was involved. With the experience from the Argentine crisis, the IMF should have transferred that knowledge to handling the Crisis in Greece.

There were criticisms that European leaders, especially those from Germany, exerted too much power and insisted on austerity measures that squeezed the Greek people hard, with little or no palliative measures for the most vulnerable.[30]

      Some Lessons Learned

1. From the Mundell-Fleming Trilemma, a country can achieve at most two out of independent monetary policy, open capital account and fixed exchange rate. By joining the euro area, Greece lost its independent monetary policy, which prevented it from exercising control over interest rates and addressing current account problems.
2. Although the rules of the Euro Area attempted to prevent moral hazards by disallowing budget deficits to be funded by central bank financing, it did not prevent countries from fiscal profligacy since there was no similarity in budgetary policies in the union.
3. The moral hazard risk remained, given that investors believed that stronger countries within the bloc would prevent weaker countries from failing, thus reinforcing the possibility of excessive risk-taking.
4. The Crisis was not only costly for Greece in terms of the structural adjustments and austerity measures it had to undertake, but was also costly for the rest of Europe and the IMF. They contributed financially to resuscitate Greece and the other European countries that suffered from the contagion.
5. Giving loans (more debts) to repay existing debts does not solve a crisis!

 

  References

European Central Bank, ECB (2000). Convergence Report. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/conrep/cr2000en.pdf?3a6a148876b98ab9ff985f2012bd8379

European Central Bank, ECB (2022). Convergence Criteria. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/escb/html/convergence-criteria.en.html

Forbes (2016). The Most Expensive Summer Olympics. https://www.forbes.com/pictures/geeg45eglhf/2-2004-athens-games/?sh=59be895bc5d6

Independent Evaluation Office, IEO (2016). The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Evaluation Report, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2009). Greece: 2009 Article IV Consultation. IMF Country Report No. 09/244, August 2009.

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2010a). Greece: Request for Stand-By Arrangement. IMF Country Report No. 10/111, May 2010.

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2010b). Greece: Stand-By Arrangement - Review Under the Emergency Financing Mechanism. IMF Country Report No. 10/217, July 2010.

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2010c). Greece: Second Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement. IMF Country Report No. 10/372, December 2010.

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2012). IMF Executive Board Approves €28 Billion Arrangement Under Extended Fund Facility for Greece. Press Release No 12/85, March 15, 2012. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr1285

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2013a). IMF Completes Third Review Under Extended Fund Facility Arrangement for Greece, Concludes 2013 Article IV Consultation. Press Release No. 13/195, May 31, 2013. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr13195

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2013b). IMF Executive Board Concludes 2013 Article IV Consultation, Completes Third Review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), and Discusses Ex Post Evaluation of 2010 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Greece. Public Information Notice No 13/64, June 5, 2013. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/pn1364

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2013c). Greece: 2013 Article IV Consultation. IMF Country Report No. 13/154, June 2013.

International Monetary Fund, IMF (2016). Greece: 2016 Article IV Consultation. IMF Country Report No. 17/40, February 2017.

Kindreich, A. (2017). The Greek Financial Crisis (2009–2016). https://www.econcrises.org/2017/07/20/the-greek-financial-crisis-2009-2016/

Larson, S. (2017). Three Trigger Points for a Greek-Style Debt Crisis. https://www.aier.org/article/three-trigger-points-for-a-greek-style-debt-crisis/

National Bank of Belgium. The institutional framework of monetary policy - The Maastricht convergence criteria. https://www.nbb.be/en/monetary-policy/general-framework/institutional-framework-monetary-policy/maastricht-convergence

Nelson, R. M., Belkin, P. & Jackson, J. K. (2017). The Greek Debt Crisis: Overview and Implications for the United States. Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, April 24, 2017, No 7–5700.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO (2010). Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence. Press Release Communique No PR/CP(2010)078, June 2010. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_06/20100610_PR_CP_2010_078.pdf

Sawe, B. E. (2018). The Most Expensive Summer Olympic Games in History. World Atlas - World Facts https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-most-expensive-summer-olympic-games-in-history.html

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[1] Kodili N. Nduka prepared this case, which was developed from published sources.

[2] The Maastricht Treaty requires that the average inflation and nominal long-term interest rates for a candidate country, a year before assessment for admission, should not exceed 1.5 and 2 percentage points, respectively, of the top three performances among Member countries in terms of price stability. The currency of the candidate country should not have devalued against the Euro for at least two years before assessment, while maintaining exchange rate fluctuations within the standard margins specified by the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Government Deficit as a percentage of GDP should not exceed three per cent; Government Debt as a percentage of GDP should not exceed 60 per cent (ECB, 2022).

[3] See ECB (2000)

[4]. See IMF (2009)

[5] The successful hosting of the 2004 Summer Olympics was estimated to have cost Greece approximately $15 billion to organise and expand infrastructure, ranking as the third-highest expenditure in the history of the Summer Olympics (Sawe, 2018).

[6] There are conflicting views concerning the Olympics' contribution to the Greek crisis. While some analysts reported that Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio remained unaffected by the Olympics, Forbes (2016) noted that Greece was encumbered with debt after the Olympic Games, as the government deficit rose to 5.3 per cent of GDP in 2004, higher than the 3 per cent target.

[7] Greece had the second-highest defence budget in NATO between 2005 and 2009, after the US (NATO, 2010).

[8] See Nelson et al. (2017)

[9] See IMF (2013c)

[10] See Nelson et al. (2017)

[11] Several analysts, including Paul Krugman, noted that the Crisis in Greece was a Balance of Payments problem that translated into a fiscal deficit problem.

[12] See IEO (2016) and IMF (2009).

[13] The actual fiscal deficit rose to about 15.6 per cent of GDP (IEO, 2016)

[14] Within the Euro area, the spreads between bonds of Member States should typically be zero, given the inherent assumption that all countries in the union are equal.

[15] IEO (2016) and IMF (2009) observed that the Crisis did not hit the banking system in Greece as severely as it did in Ireland and Portugal, as they were not as heavily leveraged. However, Nelson et al. (2017) noted that the debt problems in Greece aggravated issues in the banking sector.

[16] Special Drawing Rights (SDR) are reserve assets maintained by the IMF to enhance member countries’ foreign reserves when necessary.

[17] Greece made commitments to reduce its fiscal deficit below 3 per cent of GDP to help set its debt levels on a sustainable path by increasing taxes and cutting expenditures. It also made a commitment to reduce wage bills, including eliminating the 13th and 14th payments and pensions for all employees, while introducing flat bonuses to compensate low-income earners (IMF, 2010a).

[18] See IMF (2010b)

[19] See IMF (2010c)

[20] Euro Area leaders, particularly the German Chancellor and Finance Minister, pushed for more debt relief as they believed that the 21% haircut was insufficient to impact the sustainability of Greece's debt.

[21] See IMF (2012, 2013a).

[22] IMF (2016) reported that seven government changes within six years did little to support the structural adjustment program and sometimes paralysed the implementation of reforms.

[23] Not all the political parties were in support of the structural adjustment program, and opposition also arose within the ruling party (IMF, 2013c)

[24] See Nelson et al. (2017)

[25] During the Crisis, the ECB provided other assistance to Greece through bond purchases and long-term refinancing measures (Nelson et al., 2017).

[26] See IEO (2016)

[27] See IEO (2016)

[28] See IMF (2013b)

[29] IEO (2016) noted that the main requirements of the exceptional access program were that a country should be potentially experiencing a balance of payments problem in dire need of financing. There should be a high probability that debt will be sustainable in the medium term. The country should be able to regain access to financial markets while still owing the IMF, and the program should have a substantial chance of success. A critical review of the situation of Greece at the time did not prove convincing that it met these criteria.

[30] Kindreich (2017) reported that about 44 per cent of the population of Greece lived in poverty.